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In the early 1860s, driven by the threat of war with the United States, British army engineers 
and local contractors built a coast artillery battery 
on top of the red-coloured bluffs overlooking 
the eastern approach to Saint John harbour. 
It is broadly similar to earlier coastal batteries 
that still exist at Halifax and Quebec City, but 
on a more massive scale because artillery was 
rapidly increasing in size and power during the 
1860s. Other heavy batteries were constructed 
at other Canadian ports during that decade, but 
all were subsequently rebuilt with more modern 
structures. Red Head Battery is the only surviving 
example in the country.1 It was also the last 
major defensive work built to guard the strategic 
overland road from Saint John to the Canadian 
interior, which was the only means of access from 
the Atlantic to the interior in winter. 
 The battery recalls the danger of American 
invasion of Britain’s North American colonies 
that resulted from confrontations between Britain 
and the United States during the American 
Civil War. That menace provided a key impetus 
for Canadian Confederation in 1867, and Red 
Head Battery provides the closest association 
of any site or building to the important military 
origins of Confederation. Astonishingly, Red Head 
Battery remains largely intact today, and except 
for the ravages of weather and time, it has not 
changed since the last workmen left in 1866. 
Until recently, the site had been forgotten by 
everyone except the local residents. It deserves 
to be better known.
 Red Head Battery was constructed in direct 
response to the Trent affair of 1861. This was 
the incident that brought Britain and the United 
States closest to armed conflict during the Civil 
War. On 8 November 1861, the US cruiser San 
Jacinto seized two Confederate diplomats from 
the British steamer Trent in international waters. 
The American government did not rush to release 
the prisoners, and the British immediately 
dispatched the first of more than 11,000 troops 
to reinforce their North American colonies. War 
seemed imminent. The greatest danger was to 
the province of Canada, the southern part of 
present-day Ontario and Quebec, which was a 
long way from the centres of British sea power at 
Halifax, Nova Scotia, and Bermuda. However, it 
could be easily reached by the huge armies that 
the US federal government had mobilized. The 
situation was all the more difficult for Britain and 
her colonies because the Trent incident happened 
at the very end of the navigation season on the 
St. Lawrence River. Only the first steamships 
speeding the troops from Britain were able to 
reach Quebec in December before ice made the 
passage impossible. With the river closed, the 
British were forced to use the traditional winter 
land route to Canada through New Brunswick.2
 This connection to Quebec had been 
significant to the French before 1763, and it 
remained critically important to the British, 
particularly after the secession of the American 
colonies from the Empire in 1783. During the War 
of 1812, thousands of troops had moved up the 
Saint John and Madawaska rivers, across Lake 
Temiscouata, and down the portage to Rivière 
du Loup. After the war, the British fortified 
and secured the route, although the so-called 
Aroostook War of 1839 brought the US and 
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6Britain to the brink of war over British operation 
of the route through “disputed” territory. Without 
it, there was no effective way to communicate 
with the isolated frontier settlements of Canada 
from November to May. In 1861 the Trent affair 
again highlighted the importance of the route. 
Hasty preparations were made for steamships to 
discharge troops at Saint John, New Brunswick. 
From there they travelled by sleigh up the Saint 
John River valley and on to Rivière du Loup, 
which was the eastern terminus of the Grand 
Trunk Railway. More than 6,800 troops made 
this 309-mile trek between early January and 
mid-March 1862.
 The immediate danger of war had passed 
as early as 26 December 1861, when the US 
government finally released the Confederate 
diplomats. None of the fundamental difficulties 
created by Britain’s neutrality in the Civil War 
had been resolved, however. The first priority of 
the British commanders was to defend the sea 
around the Maritime colonies, and control enemy 
movements in adjacent waters. This was the role 
of the Royal Navy, but it could not do this and also 
guard the harbours. These had to be defended 
by coastal batteries.
 As troops began to move through Saint 
John in January 1862, Lieutenant-Colonel S. 
Westmacott, commanding the Royal Engineers 
at Halifax, and Colonel A. Bern of the Royal 
Artillery, inspected Saint John’s defences and 
recommended significant improvements. The 
permanent British garrison consisted of a few 




















Canadian Military History, Vol. 16 [2007], Iss. 2, Art. 2
http://scholars.wlu.ca/cmh/vol16/iss2/2
7outdated and inadequate system of coastal 
batteries. Originally built during the French 
Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars, these were 
located at Lower Cove and on Partridge Island. 
The Lower Cove guns, at the southern end of 
the city, were located too far into the harbour to 
be much use. Partridge Island was an exposed 
position, about a mile and a half to seaward, 
that was well positioned to guard the shipping 
channel. The barren, rocky terrain of the island, 
and the low embankments of the existing battery, 
however, offered little protection against modern 
long-range artillery firing explosive shells. 
Westmacott and Bern concluded that, “St. John 
and its Harbour may be practically considered 
as defenceless.”3
 The British were not interested in developing 
Saint John as a major base: the imperial 
dockyard and fortress at Halifax served that 
purpose. Nevertheless, Saint John was the 
seacoast terminus of the Grand Communications 
Route with the interior. The port had to be well 
defended or the province of Canada could be cut 
off during the winter months. Also, if an enemy 
could seize Saint John, it could be used as a base 
for an overland thrust against Canada, or for 
operations in the Bay of Fundy to cut off Halifax 
from the rear.
 The ideal fortress would protect Saint John 
from enemy ships and landing forces from 
Mispec Point on the east, to Sheldon Point on 
the west, which are about 6,000 yards (5500 
metres) apart. In 1862, this was well beyond the 
2,000-yard (1800 metre) effective range of the 
contemporary artillery. Bern and Westmacott 
therefore recommended that new batteries should 
be constructed at Red Head on the east, and 
Negro Point on the west, where the approaches 
narrowed to 3,000 yards, “a good front of defence 
within practicable [artillery] range.” At each 
position there should be “a substantial properly-
covered earthwork battery for ten heavy guns 
– namely – three 100 pr [pounder - the gun fired 
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8guns, and seven 68 prs of 95 cwt [the gun weighed 
95 hundredweights - 10,640 lbs (4,836 kg), and 
fired a 68-lb (31-kg) projectile] with Expense 
Magazines, Small Stores and a defensible 
barrack for 50 men with enclosure against a 
sudden attack or coup de main.” Batteries at 
the Red Head and Negro Point positions could 
also cooperate effectively with Partridge Island. 
Because the island was very exposed, Bern and 
Westmacott recommended that the existing 
weak earthwork should be replaced by “a strong 
self defensible casemated work for two to 300 
men…with a powerful armament of at least 30 
heavy guns…”
 At the height of the Trent crisis in December 
1861, the British commander at Halifax 
authorized the Saint John garrison to stockpile 
timber and sandbags. These would be used to 
construct temporary batteries at Red Head and 
Negro Point (soon to be called Fort Dufferin) if war 
broke out. Meanwhile, the British government 
rushed ten of the latest artillery pieces, 100-
pounder Armstrong guns, to Halifax. These 
were earmarked for Red Head, Negro Point and 
Partridge Island in the event of hostilities. 
 The Armstrong guns, later known as 7-inch 
rifled breech loaders, were a radical departure 
from the cast-iron, muzzle-loading, smooth-bore, 
spherical-shot-firing guns that had been standard 
for centuries. These massive new guns were 
constructed from wrought-iron tubes, that were 
shrunk around the basic barrel to give it greater 
strength. Wrought iron was stronger than cast-
iron. The interior of the bore was cut with rifling 
(spiral grooves) that gave a spin to the cylindrical 
projectile on firing. The spinning stabilized the 
shell in flight, improving range and accuracy. 
The breech was sealed by a heavy wrought iron 
block that fitted into a slot in the rear part of the 
barrel, and was locked in place by a large screw 
mechanism. Experience quickly demonstrated 
that the breech mechanism was too heavy and 
complex, and the British soon reverted to muzzle-
loading, built-up wrought-iron rifled guns. The 
Armstrong guns were therefore available for use 
in the colonies.
 These new designs and other major 
developments in artillery were soon tested in the 
American Civil War. They were part of the many 
changes in military technology that included 
the emergence of ironclad steam-powered 
warships. In 1859, France produced La Gloire, 
whose traditional wooden hull was covered with 
iron plates. The British instantly responded by 
launching the much larger HMS Warrior in 1860, 
which was entirely built of iron. The first clash 
of ironclad ships occurred just two years later 
at Hampton Roads, Virginia. There, the CSS 
Virginia, little more than a wooden steam-driven 
battery protected by iron plates, engaged the USS 
Monitor, a low-hulled iron warship mounting 
two muzzle-loading guns in a revolving turret. 
The battle between these ships was inconclusive, 
but the damage inflicted by the Virginia on the 
Union fleet before she was engaged by the Monitor 
demonstrated the vulnerability of wooden 
warships to these new weapons.4
 The design of the batteries at Red Head and 
Negro Point reflected this changing technology. 
A large number of guns were needed at each 
position, in order to provide the high volume of 
fire necessary to engage a steam-powered vessel, 
Top: Partridge Island battery in the 1860s, showing the 
low, thin earth banks that gave insufficient protection 
against new explosive shells, and the outdated cast-iron, 
solid-ball-firing smooth-bore guns that armed the Saint 
John defences. (Hargrove Collection, Partridge Island Research 
Project, kindly supplied by Harold Wright).
Above: The large Armstrong 100-pounder rifled breech 
loading gun, “built-up” from tough wrought iron tubes, which 
fired 45 kg conical explosive shells. This revolutionary new 
weapon had just entered service in 1861, and the British 
Army was prepared rapidly to install several at Red Head 
if war broke out with the United States.
4
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9which was not dependent on the wind and could 
manoeuver at will. The large guns on the ship, 
moreover, could deliver a heavy weight of high 
explosive shells, which demanded a high level of 
protection at the battery. Therefore, although the 
general design of the new Saint John batteries 
was similar to earlier works, the structures were 
more massive and designed to absorb much 
heavier punishment. The parapets, for example, 
at the Lower Cove, were only eight feet (2.4 
metres) thick, and the guns were mounted to fire 
over the top. The parapets of the new batteries 
would be thirty feet (9 metres) thick, rising 
eight feet (2.4 metres) above the floor of the gun 
positions. As a result, the guns were fired through 
embrasures cut in the parapet, the faces of which 
were reinforced with local stone and capped with 
brick. This design presented only a small opening 
to seaward, covering the crews during loading 
and firing. Between each pair of guns would 
be a heavily-built masonry “expense” magazine 
for ammunition. This would be covered with 
five feet (1.5 metres) of earth. These magazines 
also created a protective wall, or “traverse,” 
perpendicular to the parapet, to protect gun 
crews against fire from a ship positioned to fire 
shells up the length of the battery.
 The British Army’s Royal Engineers had 
great experience in constructing the empire’s 
fortifications, and this was a standard design. The 
Trent crisis was only one of a number of incidents 
that highlighted the need to improve coastal 
defences in Britain, Canada, the West Indies, 
and elsewhere. Since the early 1840s, a series 
of panics had resulted from fears that hostile 
powers could use new technology, particularly 
fast, steam-powered warships, to evade the Royal 
Navy and attack the empire’s ports. Steamships 
meant that the bombardment of coastal towns, 
the landing of troops for raids, or even a full scale 
invasion, could not be anticipated by the state of 
wind, weather, or tide. Permanent shore defences 
were now more important than ever. However, 
it was physically – and financially – impossible 
to fortify every port that might become a target. 
Therefore, Westmacott and Bern’s detailed 
strategic assessment was critically important. 
It allowed the British commanders to decide if 
Saint John needed improved defences, and how 
much of their limited budget should be allocated 
for this task.
  Unlike Halifax, Quebec, or Bermuda, Saint 
John was not a major base for British naval or 
land forces. That placed the city in a category 
similar to commercial ports in Great Britain, 
for whose defence the British government 
insisted on municipal assistance. Their logic 
was that the defences helped to secure the local 
The two central gun positions, looking north towards Courtenay Bay and the eastern suburbs of Saint John, showing 
a side view of the northern expense magazine. The earth covering of the magazine had two purposes, to protect the 
magazine, and also to create a traverse to prevent shells fired from a ship bearing out to sea to the south from “raking” 
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10
economy, so commercial interests should help 
to pay for the protection. This model was doubly 
applicable to Saint John. Since the 1840s, the 
British government had been pressing the self-
governing colonies in North America to assume 
a much larger share of the responsibilities and 
costs of their own defence. Thus, as soon as 
Westmacott and Bern completed their survey, 
General Hastings Doyle, the commander-in-chief 
at Halifax, asked the New Brunswick government 
to provide, free of charge, land for the proposed 
new batteries at Red Head and Negro Point. The 
New Brunswick government did so.5
 Detailed records for the construction of Red 
Head and Negro Point batteries have not been 
found. However, they are available for a nearly 
identical project, the construction of Chapel 
Point Battery at Sydney Mines, Nova Scotia. 
These show that the Royal Engineers engaged 
and closely supervised local contractors, and 
that the progress of work was dictated by the 
money available in the annual budget of the 
British command at Halifax. Those funds, 
allocated by the British government on the 
basis of compromises among the large demands 
from the whole empire, were never adequate. 
The detailed correspondence for Chapel Point 
Battery, concerning what work could or could 
not be funded in a particular working season, 
would make depressingly familiar reading for 
any present-day government official or corporate 
executive. It says much for the impact of the Trent 
crisis, and the important role played by Saint 
John in the winter reinforcement of Canada, that 
even the basic structures of the Red Head and 
Negro Point batteries were built.6
 It was planned to mount ten heavy guns in a 
dog-leg shaped position at Red Head, in groups 
of two with expense magazines between each 
group. Six would face east towards Partridge 
Island. At the southern end of the battery, the 
other four guns would angle slightly inland to 
engage ships approaching the harbour from the 
southeast. Clearing the heavy underbrush at the 
site, an undertaking repeated by the Canadian 
4 Engineer Support Regiment in April 2005 
using gasoline-powered chain saws and wood 
chippers, however, revealed a major problem. 
The land at the southern end of the site, where 
the four most seaward guns were to be installed, 
Progress drawing of the Red Head battery, signed by Lieutenant-Colonel S. Westmacott, Commanding Royal Engineers 
at Halifax, dated 31 December 1863, and showing that no work had been undertaken on the four gun emplacements 
planned for the left (southern) flank pending decisions resulting from the discovery the ground dropped away and made 
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sloped sharply downwards. In the summer of 
1863, Colonel W.F.D. Jervois, Deputy Inspector 
General of Fortifications in London, visited Red 
Head as part of an inspection tour of British 
North America, and his report was very critical 
of the site:
The work here will be isolated and unsupported, 
and should certainly be capable of self-defence, 
but this does not appear to have been borne 
in mind in the preparation of the plan now in 
progress. The five left guns of the ten proposed 
to be mounted are placed on the slope of a hill 
in such a manner that they would be liable to 
be seen into from the high ground to the S.E. of 
the battery, and even from the ground near the 
beach about Cranberry Pt. I am not sure indeed 
that they could not be enfiladed from the beach 
[below the battery] itself. These guns on the slope 
of the hill should I think be omitted – and the 
left [south] flank of the battery should be close 
to the summit of Red Head. This alteration will 
reduce the number of guns to five or six, instead 
of ten as originally proposed, and in my opinion 
six guns will be quite sufficient for this site, the 
intention of placing guns thereon being solely to 
prevent an enemy’s ships hugging the Eastern 
shore at high tide and so escaping the fire of the 
guns on Partridge Island.…7 
Colonel Westmacott at Halifax did not appreciate 
this intervention from head office. He blamed 
the local supervisor for poor implementation of 
the original plan. He also observed that Jervois 
attached undue importance to the danger from 
landing parties, because the battery’s main 
purpose was to engage enemy warships.
…that a sea Battery should be commanded or 
seen into by ground adjacent or in its rear is 
very general and in most cases unavoidable 
by [as?] ground naturally falls towards the sea 
and Batteries are placed as much in advance 
as possible – the first object is to get the best 
seaward range and so long as the work is not 
seen into or enfiladed from sea the land question 
is of little importance. In this case Cranberry Pt. 
is 2000 yards distant [ie., at the very extreme 
limits of small arms fire that would be the main 
danger from a landing party] – but if the left of the 
Battery is on the slope of the hill “dipping rapidly 
towards the beach” it is evident that the Executive 
Officer in charge has made an alteration and a 
blunder since I first laid out the work (N.B. The 
Bush then covered the site now cleared) and I 
quite concur in the propriety of stopping that 
side of the Battery for the present.…
 Though I concur in the proposal to omit 
for the present the four left guns for the reason 
given, I should regret to see the original number 
of ten [reduced]…the space to be covered is very 
extensive and hence requires a larger Armament 
than a more restricted channel.
 I have replied to these remarks more fully 
than I intended but it appeared desirable to 
explain that the whole subject had already been 
very carefully considered before advocating or 
adopting any measures of defence. 8
 Subsequent correspondence on the redesign 
of the southern part of the battery has not 
been found, but the results, carried out during 
the 1864 and 1865 construction seasons, are 
abundantly clear at the site. Despite Westmacott’s 
appeal to rework the fortification so that the 
full planned armament of ten guns could be 
accommodated, only the six positions which 
had been started in 1862-3 were completed. 
The solution to the problem posed by the 
Left: The original plan for the 10-gun battery at Red Head. (“Red Head St. John NB Shewing revised site for New Battery...To 
accompany C.R.E’s memo...3rd Dec 63,” courtesy of Harold Wright)
Right: A Canadian government clerk’s copy of the sketch Colonel W.F.D. Jervois made of Red Head battery during his 
inspection tour of 1863. Jervois’s report resulted in the cancellation of the four gun positions (labelled here as a,b,f,e) 
planned for the southern, seaward part of the battery. These positions, he argued, would be exposed to enemy fire 
because of the downward slope of the ground. He also recommended the construction of a masonry, loop-holed “keep” 
at “x” on the plan, and the construction of walls and ditches, shown by the dashed lines, to protect the battery from raiding 
parties of infantry. “Defences of New Brunswick (St. John),” Stewart Collection, Canadian War Museum.
7
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sloping ground was dictated by economy. As a 
group of University of New Brunswick students 
discovered, while struggling through the dense 
woods in a tour led by the authors in 2001, the 
southern flank of the battery has been closed by a 
towering earth mound or “traverse”. This screens 
the site from both the beach below and the high 
ground adjacent to the harbour approaches, 
and was the cheapest way to provide the most 
basic protection. Jervois, while arguing that six 
guns were sufficient, had actually recommended 
measures that were much more elaborate – and 
expensive – to guard against landing parties:
This may be effected by constructing a tower 
(with a magazine under it) at the gorge [ie in 
the open area behind the gun positions], and 
cutting ditches running out to the cliff. These 
ditches to have in them a wall or high stockade 
as an obstacle, and to be flanked from the “keep” 
[the tower]. If necessary, the obstacle [ie, wall or 
stockade] might also be continued along the face 
of the battery, or on the slope of the cliff.9
 In the event, no permanent defensive 
positions guarding the rear of the battery were 
ever constructed. The completed work contained 
six gun positions. Five of these aim directly 
towards Partridge island, effectively sealing the 
eastern channel into the harbour. The sixth at 
the north end, is oriented to fire into the inner 
harbour. All the construction materials appear to 
be local. The foundation of the gun positions was 
field stone, and the general shape of the battery 
was contoured with glacial till quarried just to the 
north of the site. The red slate stone used to face 
the gun positions is, according to locals, from a 
quarry about a kilometre inland. The red brick 
used to build the magazines, and the granite gun 
races and facings on the magazines, were also 
probably of local origin.
 Jervois’ inspection tour in 1863, and another 
in 1865, assessed the number and type of modern 
fortifications that were necessary to defend 
British North America against the United States. 
Considering what the Civil War had revealed 
about American military strength, Jervois’ call 
for more extensive works at Red Head was 
typical of his reports on the vulnerable points 
on the Canadian frontier and in the Maritime 
Provinces. Even the formidable citadels at Halifax 
and Quebec City, built in the 1820s-40s, would 
be of limited use when faced by armoured steam 
warships, modern artillery, and the large infantry 
and cavalry forces of the Americans. All existing 
fortifications had to be supplemented or replaced 
Above: The entrance to the southern expense magazine. 
Note the heavy earth cover over top of the magazine.
Right: The interior of one of the expense magazines, 
showing the excellent condition of the masonry. The brick 
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by more heavily built works, and armed with 
expensive rifled guns. Otherwise, the few tens of 
thousands of British regular soldiers, and the 
more numerous (but largely untrained or only 
partially trained) colonial militia, would stand 
no chance.
 British Army estimates of the cost of modern 
fortifications for Toronto, Kingston, Montreal, 
Quebec City, and Saint John were in the order 
of £1.6 million. This was an enormous price, the 
equivalent of a multi-billion dollar undertaking 
today. Saint John’s share was large, as much 
as £200,000.10 A small part of that sum would 
provide the tower, walls, and ditches that Jervois 
recommended for Red Head. The bulk would be 
needed for a substantial fort on Partridge Island, 
virtually a land battleship, with guns installed 
in earth-covered masonry rooms to protect the 
exposed and isolated site.
 The heavy financial burden of defending 
British North America against the United States 
played a large part in bringing the British 
government strongly to support the scheme for 
the confederation of the colonies promoted by the 
government of the province of Canada. United, 
the colonies could better muster resources for 
defence. Also, a new nation that was nominally 
independent from Britain, and less dependent 
on British armed forces, would be less likely to 
arouse the animosity of anti-British elements in 
the United States. In New Brunswick, however, 
such large strategic issues were submerged 
in local concerns. In early 1865, the colony 
elected an anti-confederation government, but 
the defence issue descended the province in the 
spring of 1866. Then, the Fenians, Irish-American 
nationalists who were bent on the conquest of 
British North America, gathered for a much-
publicized convention at Eastport, Maine near the 
international border. New Brunswick mobilized 
its partially organized militia, including volunteers 
who assisted the small British garrison at Saint 
John in guarding the port. 
Detail of one side of a gun emplacement showing the cut stone revetting that strengthened the heavy earth bank. On the 
right is one side of the embrasure through which the gun would have fired. Here the stone reinforcement was particularly 
important to prevent erosion of the earth bank by the blast from the gun’s fire. Partridge Island is on the upper left, linked 
by the breakwater to Dufferin Point, just visible on the right. Red Head’s armament was to cooperate with fire from guns 
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 By early 1866, Red Head Battery was “three-
quarters” complete. This meant everything had 
been finished except for the hardware necessary 
to mount the guns. The battery would have looked 
much as it does today, apart from the effects of 
time in displacing some of the masonry, and 
the erosion of the earth covering the parapets 
and magazines. The most challenging task 
had been the installation of the semi-circular 
racers in each of the six gun positions. These 
were heavy, precisely-cut, granite blocks, set on 
deep foundation stones, that provided a stable, 
perfectly level surface on which the wheels of the 
gun platforms traversed.11 With this completed, 
Red Head stood ready to receive its guns – should 
the need arise.
 No additional work appears to have been 
carried out during the Fenian crisis of early 
1866. The Fenians had no large ships, and 
could threaten only small-scale raids on the 
port facilities. British warships from Halifax 
quickly arrived in the Bay of Fundy, carrying a 
full battalion of infantry and two batteries of field 
artillery. This, and the somewhat belated action 
by American authorities in Maine to seize Fenian 
arms caches and arrest leaders, ended the main 
danger in the latter part of April 1866. One of the 
results of the crisis was that the British governor, 
Arthur Gordon, dismissed the anti-confederation 
government, and called on pro-confederation 
leaders to form a new administration. This was 
a key step in achieving British British North 
American confederation, and the creation of 
the new Dominion of Canada on 1 July 1867. 
The “staggering” cost of the mobilization of the 
militia in New Brunswick to meet the crisis, 
$111,853.28, helped overcome opposition to 
confederation.12 Defence would henceforth be the 
responsibility of the new federal government.
 As part of the preparations for confederation, 
the province of Canada had discussed defence 
requirements with the British government. 
Britain made it clear that she would soon be 
greatly reducing the number of troops deployed to 
protect the Canadian frontier. Canada, therefore, 
agreed to implement most of Jervois’ fortification 
scheme. Britain, as its part of the bargain, 
spent some £200,000 from 1866 to 1872 in 
constructing three massive forts on the south 
shore of the St. Lawrence River to protect Quebec 
City. The city was the key to the defence of the 
entire Canadian interior against American attack. 
Britain also spent £180,000 on an entirely new 
set of coastal defence batteries at Halifax. This 
was not completely unselfish. Armed with heavy 
rifled guns, the forts secured the Royal Navy base 
against a strike by American warships.
 The new Canadian federal government agreed 
to build the fortifications at the other points, 
including Saint John, and in 1869 secured a 
guarantee from the British government for a 
loan of £1.1 million to fund the massive projects. 
That same year, as part of the reduction of the 
Above left: A view of a full gun emplacement, with the embrasure through which the gun fired at the centre. Partridge 
Island is visible above the left hand side of the embrasure. Above right: The southern, seaward part of the battery, with 
Mispec Point in the distance. This view shows how the ground of the site drops off sharply to the south. This was the 
difficulty that led the Royal Engineers to cancel construction of the four southernmost gun positions planned, and erect 
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British troops that had guarded Canada during 
the American Civil War, the small British garrison 
left Saint John. All the land and forts were turned 
over to the new federal government. Tensions 
with the United States were greatly reduced by 
the Treaty of Washington in 1871, and in any 
case, the United States had demobilized the 
forces created during the Civil War. At the end of 
the year, the last British troops on the Canada-
US frontier left for home. Only 2,000 British 
troops remained at Halifax to secure the imperial 
fortress and dockyard. 
 By then, the Americans were focussing their 
energies on reconstructing the South, and building 
transcontinental railways for development of the 
West. Canadian leaders also wanted to build a 
railway from Ontario to British Columbia. This 
was necessary to secure the western territories 
recently acquired from the Hudson’s Bay 
Company against American encroachment. The 
government also had to meet its commitment 
for the rail link that had persuaded British 
Columbia to join Confederation. In 1873, the 
British government agreed that the fortification 
loan guarantee could be used to fund the Pacific 
railway, and the funds to complete Red Head 
battery and modernize the rest of the Saint John 
defences were no longer available. Construction 
of the railways ended the need for the Saint John 
River route to Canada, so today, Red Head stands 
as the last monument to the importance of that 
communications link. 
 In the first decades of Confederation, Saint 
John was Canada’s busiest ice-free major port. 
The commercial importance of the city meant 
that the new Dominion government could not 
completely neglect its defence. In 1872, the 
Canadian government engaged a senior British 
officer, Lieutenant-General Sir Edward Selby 
Smyth as “General Officer Commanding the 
Militia” to help organize and administer the 
Dominion’s defences. One of his big problems 
was to modernize the coastal defences at a 
considerably lower cost than estimated by 
Jervois. Although war with the United States 
looked increasingly unlikely, other potentially 
hostile nations were building fleets of modern 
warships. These could cross the oceans to strike 
at Canada. Selby Smyth thought he had the 
answer by using converted guns named after 
the British inventor Sir Edward Palliser. He had 
developed a process for reaming out old cast-iron 
smooth-bore cannons and inserting a rifled sleeve 
of tough wrought iron. This enabled the old guns 
to fire modern projectiles, at a small fraction of 
the cost of new rifled guns. One of Selby Smyth’s 
top priorities was to arm the Saint John defences, 
including Red Head, with Palliser’s guns. However, 
after his first order arrived in 1875, the British 
War Office discouraged the project on the grounds 
that the converted guns were adequate only to 
supplement, not replace, modern artillery. Only 
five of the Palliser guns slated for Saint John were 
delivered, and Selby Smyth had these installed 
at Fort Dufferin (as Negro Point battery had been 
renamed in honour of Canada’s new governor-
general, the Earl of Dufferin.) Placing the guns 
at Fort Dufferin also allowed the militia to have 
easy access for training, and the site became an 
A snapshot taken during the early part of the Second 
World War that shows one of the 32-pounder smooth-bore 
cannon installed at Red Head in 1878, in response to a 
war scare with Russia. The guns were removed soon after 
this photograph was taken in a scrap metal drive to provide 
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important camp for artillery units in eastern 
Canada until the 1890s.
 Selby Smyth was wise to worry about 
threats from powers other than the United 
States. During Britain’s confrontation with 
Russia in 1877-8, there was good intelligence 
that Russian seamen and artillery had arrived 
at Ellsworth, Maine. In the event of war, they 
intended to charter fast steamships and prey on 
British shipping, probably in the Bay of Fundy. 
The British government warned Canada that it 
should not rely on British warships to protect 
the coast. The British fleet would be completely 
committed in countering Russia’s main naval 
forces. In the spring of 1878, Selby Smyth did 
his best to improve the coastal defences with the 
few resources at hand. Red Head battery was 
finally armed with four 32-pounder smooth-bore 
cannon, which were the best guns immediately 
available from Canadian stocks, but severely 
outdated. In London, a special “colonial defence 
committee” was created to consider the empire’s 
port defences in light of the Russian threat. They 
advised Canada to equip Red Head, Fort Dufferin, 
and Partridge Island with heavy rifled guns, but 
the estimated cost was so great that the Canadian 
government dismissed this advice out of hand13. 
The Russian crisis was resolved without war, and 
the 32-pounders remained at Red Head, rotting 
away on their wooden carriages, until they were 
removed for scrap during the Second World 
War.
  As a result of major improvements in artillery 
technology, Red Head returned to the centre 
of Canadian defence planning in 1902-4. The 
development of long-barrelled guns with efficient 
breech-loading systems in the late nineteenth 
century once again transformed naval warfare, 
and consequently coastal defence. The new 
guns fired high explosive shells accurately and 
rapidly to ranges of 10,000 metres or more. 
The Canadian government procured some of 
these guns to protect the two major east coast 
ports, Saint John and Quebec City. The two 
heaviest guns were intended to be mounted 
in large steel-reinforced concrete pits at Red 
Head, and could cover all the approaches to the 
port. However, before this could take place, the 
British reduced their garrison at Halifax. This 
forced the Canadian government, in one of its 
The two modern 7.5-inch breech-loading guns purchased by the Canadian government for Red Head in 1904. Because 
of changing defence priorities they were mounted at Martinière battery, shown here in 1936, on the south shore of the 
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rare major defence initiatives, to take over the 
imperial fortress and modernize its forts with 
long-barrelled breech-loaders. With Halifax 
connected to central Canada by rail, and its 
forts now a Dominion responsibility, Saint John 
slipped significantly in the priorities for national 
defence. The two big 7.5-inch guns ordered for 
Red Head were instead installed in a new concrete 
battery at Point Martinière, on the south shore of 
the St. Lawrence River below the port of Quebec. 
These guns were Quebec City’s principal seaward 
defences throughout the First World War, and 
most of the Second World War.14
 During the First World War, Saint John 
proved essential to the shipment of war supplies 
to Great Britain, but the need for coastal defences 
had diminished significantly. Coal-fired vessels 
lacked the range and endurance to roam freely, 
compared to the sailing vessels in the 1860s 
and 1870s that used steam only as an auxiliary 
power source. The main threat was an attack by 
Germany’s long-range submarines, and against 
these, small-calibre quick-firing guns and 
searchlights on Partridge Island were sufficient. 
 However, during the 1930s, Germany 
constructed large oil-fired surface warships, in 
addition to re-establishing their U-boat fleet. 
This left no doubt about the need to provide 
more substantial defences at Canada’s east coast 
ports. At the beginning of the Second World 
War, the Canadian Army developed a full set of 
coast artillery defences at Saint John. These, 
in essence, were based on the plans made in 
the 1860s-70s and early 1900s. But much had 
changed, and this time technology by-passed 
Red Head completely. The latest heavy guns had 
ranges of 20,000 metres and more. The major 
“counter-bombardment” battery was therefore 
installed at Mispec Point, on the outer limit of 
the harbour approaches. This was the site that 
the Royal Engineers had identified as the best 
position for advanced defences, should guns of 
sufficient range ever be developed. In the inner 
harbour, the construction of the Courtney Bay dry 
dock, and the large breakwater that protected it, 
had changed the defensive geography. A new inner 
defence battery to cover the eastern harbour was 
installed at the tip of the breakwater. However, 
Red Head was developed, along with Sheldon 
A view of the northern part of the battery from the rear (east). In the centre is the northern expense magazine, clearly 
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Point, as a dummy gun position. Telephone poles 
were pushed through the parapets, and the site 
was covered with camouflage netting: the cables 
and ground pegs remain on site today.
 Local memories of Red Head’s military 
importance persisted. In 1942, when Canada was 
scrambling to complete its east coast defences in 
the face of a new transatlantic German submarine 
offensive, a reporter from the Saint John Times-
Globe visited Red Head:
A path, overgrown in summer with tall grasses, 
leads from each gun to the powder… magazines. 
Set into the side of the hill, the two stone store-
houses are in almost as good condition as when 
they were built, nearly a century ago.
Timothy and grasses, starred with daisies, grow 
about their open doorways, but the weather-worn 
stones are firmly cemented together still, and 
the vaulted brickwork inside is barely touched 
by time. Here and there, a white streak of mold 
or a flake off the face of a brick bears witness to 
the fact that the magazines have been standing 
since the American North and South struggled 
for supremacy.
But the scenes suggestive of war are fled, and 
Red Head cows now peacefully graze upon the 
spot once echoed with Canada’s former effort 
preparedness for a feared invasion.15 
 Little had changed in the intervening 59 years 
when the authors visited Red Head in 2001, 
except that the cows were long gone, explaining 
why the site had been completely overgrown. 
 The shock waves created by the American 
Civil War, which brought Saint John and Red 
Head into the strategic limelight in 1861-5, also 
helped to produce Canadian confederation. But 
nation-building quickly shunted Red Head into 
the shadows. The focus of the new dominion 
was transcontinental development, not maritime 
affairs, and certainly not coastal defence. The 
neglect caused by the shift in priorities, the 
advance of military technology, and the physical 
isolation of Red Head, sealed the battery in a sort 
of time capsule. By contrast, Fort Dufferin, on 
the foreshore of West Saint John, was an active 
military site through the Second World War, 
and modern structures disrupted the original 
emplacements. More recently, in the 1990s, the 
central part of the fort became a gravel pit, and 
excavations undermined the few remaining works 
from the 1860s. The other close sister of Red 
Head and Fort Dufferin, Chapel Point Battery near 
Sydney Mines, Nova Scotia, was abandoned in 
the late 1800s. In 1940, the last remnants of the 
battery were levelled to make way for a modern 
fort. Only Red Head remains.
 Defence is not always about fighting. 
Often, it is more concerned with preparation 
and deterrence. In 1777, Agreen Crabtree, a 
particularly nasty privateer and pirate sailed 
into the unprotected Saint John harbour and 
plundered and vandalized the settlement. When 
he came back the following year, Fort Howe 
stood on the heights above the city, and Crabtree 
turned about and never returned. None of the 
fortifications at Saint John in the late nineteenth 
century could have withstood a major assault. 
But they were there, their presence deterred 
minor raids, and a major assault would have 
required considerable naval support, which 
would have drawn large forces from the Royal 
Navy. Red Head Battery and the other Saint John 
forts served their purpose well.
 No one has ever removed anything substantial 
(except the granite gun races from one position) 
from Red Head. Even today, the suburban 
sprawl that blights the countryside around 
most cities has bypassed the old battery and the 
headland. The accidental preservation of the 
fortifications is remarkable, and the integrity 
of their historical setting on the wood-capped 
bluffs more remarkable still. Red Head remains 
virtually unchanged from its original form, and is 
unique in Canada for its architecture. It is the site 
most closely associated with the war scares with 
the United States that did so much to bring about 
Confederation, and it is the last guardian of the 
Grand Communications Route to Canada before 
the advent of the transcontinental railway.
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